tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15559257.post6424473872737877631..comments2023-10-28T03:27:48.415-07:00Comments on Books are my only friends: A bit of military historyTripphttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10167966624693577245noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15559257.post-39937186644110680772009-06-24T20:34:41.597-07:002009-06-24T20:34:41.597-07:00I think that Budiansky would support attacking tha...I think that Budiansky would support attacking that which helped the Germans project power (railroads, fuel dumps, etc) over production, as the latter was often almost immediately restarted at the same rate. He does note that the strategic campaign forced a huge redirection of German resources to air defense and lead to the end of the Luftwaffe.<br /><br />On UAVS, for certain. I don't think the Air Force culture is too keen on the move to drones.Tripphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10167966624693577245noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-15559257.post-13243847348264157302009-06-23T13:50:35.742-07:002009-06-23T13:50:35.742-07:00Interesting. My recollection of Max Hasting's...Interesting. My recollection of Max Hasting's criticism of WW2 Allied air power - at least in the Eurpoean theater - was the strategic emphasis on carpet bombing civilian population centers (e.g. Dresden), instead of focusing on industrial/oil refining targets that would actually slow the German war machine. In Armageddon, he did not seem to be as hung up on lack of close ground support - haven't read his "Bomber Command," so I don't know if he parsed strategy vs. tactics in that book or not.<br /><br />I am about halfway through The Gamble by Tom Ricks, which mentions expanded availablity of UAVs/drones in 2006-07 as a development that enhanced Odierno's ability to effectively redeploy ground troops into Iraqi population centers consistent with the counterinsurgeny doctrine as revamped by Petraeus.Brackhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16192217051455130379noreply@blogger.com